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Abstract: “Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity” – so says Hanlon’s Razor. 
This principle is designed to curb the human tendency toward explaining other people’s behavior by moralizing 
it. In this article, we ask whether Hanlon’s Razor is good or bad advice. After offering a nuanced interpretation 
of the principle, we critically evaluate two strategies purporting to show it is good advice. Our discussion 
highlights important, unsettled questions about an idea that has the potential to infuse greater humility and 




People screw up. How should we explain their errors?  
 
Potentially helpful advice comes from a principle named Hanlon’s Razor—Never attribute to 
malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.1 The principle is called a “razor” after 
Ockham’s Razor, the famous rule of thumb that recommends simple explanations over 
complex ones, an idea designed to curb the human tendency toward metaphysical 
extravagance. Hanlon’s Razor is meant to curb our tendency toward attributional 
extravagance, our proclivity to make sense of other people’s bad behavior by moralizing it. 
The Razor has been widely noted, because it seems to encapsulate an insight into human 
psychology and wise judgment. 
 
An example will demonstrate Hanlon’s Razor in action. Imagine you and your neighbor 
disagree about a hot-button issue such as immigration policy, climate change, or the death 
penalty. After a conversation at a backyard barbecue, you feel strongly that she must lack 
basic human empathy. (How else, you wonder to yourself, could she believe those horrible 
things?) But then you recall the Razor’s advice and realize that her wrong thinking might 
better be explained by misinformation she received from her favored pundits. Perhaps your 
neighbor is not morally defective—she could just be confused about the facts. Your reflection 
on the conflict, guided by the Razor, leads you to readjust your view of your neighbor. You 
“shave off” a moralized explanation for your neighbor’s thinking. 
 
Despite the resonance and potential usefulness of Hanlon’s Razor, we know of no 
philosophical or scientific work that explores it directly. Our guiding question here is simple. 
Is Hanlon’s Razor good advice or bad? The Razor falls into a genre of techniques to improve 
human judgment, similar to advice such as “consider the opposite,” “listen to both sides,” or 
“never judge a book by its cover.” Even if the Razor is flawed in some respects, our 








Our discussion will proceed as follows. The standard formulation of the Razor leaves some 
crucial details unstated or unsettled and so we begin in §2 by giving a more carefully nuanced 
version. Then in §3 and §4 we focus on two explanations for why the Razor is good advice. 
The first explanation says the Razor is helpful because it improves judgmental accuracy: it 
helps us more accurately perceive the sources of our opponents’ errors. The second 
explanation is that the Razor is good advice because makes us more charitable toward others: 
it helps us to see their errors as intellectually misguided rather than morally defective, even 
when our generous viewpoint doesn’t match reality. We argue that both explanations have 
serious limitations and then in §5 note how failures of self-insight can make the Razor 
ineffective. In §6, we conclude by returning to the thought that being accurate and charitable 
are both values that the principle could help people attain. A deep problem, we point out, is 
that the Razor can’t balance these values in the way our circumstances frequently demand. 
 
2. Sharpening Hanlon’s Razor 
 
We will ask and answer four questions about the Razor and thereby reveal the principle’s 
essential features.  
 
First, according to the Razor, what is it that we should be cautious about attributing to malice? 
While it is certainly possible to invoke malice to explain someone’s correct views or good 
behavior, we think the Razor is normally used to explain people’s errors and mistakes—
namely, beliefs we perceive as mistaken or behavior we believe is irrational. Importantly, that 
person need not have done something that’s necessarily wrong in a normative sense. It is just 
that their behavior deviates from what we think is right or reasonable—that is, we believe they 
disagree with us about what is true or rational. Whenever someone’s error could be due to 
malice or stupidity, the Razor’s message is to proceed cautiously, ruling out stupidity before 
positing malice. In other words, the Razor recommends a defeasible presumption in favor of 
stupidity as the explanation for others’ mistakes. 
 
Second, what is the meaning of the term “stupidity” in the Razor? Like the notion of “malice,” 
we understand “stupidity” to cover many possibilities. Some are dispositions, including the 
inability to think or reason effectively, the inability to search for available evidence, various 
(non-moral or “cold”) biases, and so on. Other kinds of “stupidity” are states or state-like: a 
lack of accurate information about the topic at issue, being deceived or misled, a lapse in 
intelligence (on the part of an intelligent thinker), an instance of bad reasoning (by a normally 
good reasoner), a lapse of attention (by a normally attentive thinker), a failure to seek out 
relevant evidence (by a normally curious or well-informed thinker). In other words, while 
malice attributes another’s error to a moral defect, stupidity implies instead that the cause of 
the error lies in an epistemic defect. Note that we understand epistemic defects to include 
circumstances that systemically induce error. In such circumstances, a person may reason 
flawlessly and nevertheless mess up. To avoid error and know the truth, someone requires 
dispositions and states for thinking well—relevant cognitive skills, good evidence, favorable 
circumstances, and so on. The Razor advises us to try to explain someone’s error in terms of 




Third, what exactly is it to “attribute to malice” people’s errors? When someone else makes 
what we take to be an error, the error could be explained by a moral defect. We read “malice” 
in the Razor broadly to include unwarranted self-interest, pride, moral corruption, lack of 
empathy, lack of compassion, prejudice, ill will, spite, hatred, cruelty, and the like. When we 
“attribute to malice” some error you make, we posit a moral defect in you. We explain your 
error by moralizing it—you err because you’re bad.2  
 
Fourth, in what kind of situations is the Razor supposed to apply? That is, when is its advice 
likely to be most relevant? We noted it’s supposed to help when people think someone else 
has made a mistake, but we can say more. Sometimes attributing error to malice or stupidity 
is a non-starter and the Razor should not be applied. For instance, when a person fails on a 
straightforward task of ability, such as solving a simple arithmetic problem, observers are 
likely to see stupidity as an obvious and adequate explanation, with little need to consider 
malice as a potential explanation. And when a person fails a straightforward test of ethical 
judgment or moral sensitivity—such as recognizing that torturing innocent people for 
pleasure is wrong—observers are likely to quickly issue a malice attribution, viewing stupidity 
as inadequate to explain such a blatant moral failing. The Razor appears most relevant when 
instances of both attribution types are plausible and thus “in play.” Think of the range of cases 
as spread out along a spectrum, where the plausibility of the relevant attributions varies from 
highly plausible to highly implausible. The Razor applies to cases toward the middle of the 
spectrum, not the extreme ends. It is generic advice but not universal in scope.  
 
We propose to sharpen Hanlon’s Razor as follows: When someone’s error in belief or 
behavior can be plausibly explained by either malice or stupidity, never attribute that error to a 
moral defect when it can be adequately explained by an epistemic one. What this version lacks in 
catchiness, it makes up for in clarity. Let’s now proceed to investigate our main question: Is 
Hanlon’s Razor good or bad advice?  
 
3. Debiasing biased attributions 
 
The Razor may be good advice because it improves the accuracy of our judgments about 
others. Try a first pass on the idea. Plausibly, people are over-inclined to see the world through 
a moral lens (Rozin 1999; Tetlock 2003; Knobe 2010). Situations, topics, and questions that 
do not necessarily concern morality become “moralized.” And even when issues do have 
legitimate moral aspects, people are too harsh in their judgments of opponents’ moral 
character. Consequently, people often mistakenly attribute their opponents’ thinking and 
behavior to moral defects, rather than to differences in evidence, reasoning styles, or other 
epistemic factors. To the extent that people’s blunders are due more often to epistemic defects 
than moral ones, the Razor’s message should make attributions more accurate. In other 
words, the Razor’s message could be debiasing because it de-moralizing.  
 
2 The term “malice” normally picks out an evil intention to harm or cause injury. On our 
interpretation of the Razor, the term refers to a range of morally bad features, in addition to 
an ill will. In support of our interpretation is the fact that people sometimes appeal to the 
Razor to curb attributions of prejudice, self-interest, and other states that do not require 




We can summarize that reasoning as follows: 
 
(1) Our negative moral attributions are systematically biased in some conflict3 
C.  
(2) If our negative moral attributions are systematically biased in C, then 
following the Razor’s guidance can make our negative moral attributions 
more accurate in C. 
(3) Therefore, following the Razor’s guidance can make our negative moral 
attributions more accurate in C. 
 
Let’s examine each premise. Is premise (1) plausible? Psychological research suggests that 
humans are inveterate moralizers—or, to use a bit of contemporary vernacular, people are 
judgy. Moral condemnation and the desire to punish moral transgressors is a cultural universal 
that plays a crucial role in maintaining social coordination and cooperation (Boyd and 
Richerson 1992; Fehr and Gachter 2002; Henrich et al. 2006). Philip Tetlock (2003), for 
example, characterizes people as “lay theologians,” with a deep concern for upholding values 
they see as sacred, and whose moral sensitivities often influence judgment processes that are 
normatively unrelated to moral considerations, such as the evaluation of trade-offs, the use of 
base-rate information, and the consideration of counterfactuals (Tetlock et al. 2000). People 
can’t easily shut off their inner-moralizer and may be prone to overattribute moral defects to 
others.  
 
A number of studies reveal a tendency to attribute malice to others. Focusing on cases of 
moral and political disagreement, Glenn Reeder and colleagues (2005) found strong 
“egocentric motive attribution”: people tend to attribute self-interest and other negative 
motives to their opponents. Negative motive attributions were “magnified among those most 
strongly involved in the issue,” and subjects were “wary of hidden motives in the opposition 
and even tended to doubt that the opposition was aware of its own motives” (Reeder et al. 
2005, 1508). Confidently believing our opponents are wrong leads us to view them as driven 
by bad motives—even when we lack good evidence showing what their motives are. In 
another study, Joel Walmsley and Cathal O’Madagain (2020) found that experimental 
subjects tend “to expect other people to be more likely to act on the worst motive attributed 
to them” (2020, 7). When subjects evaluated others’ motives in the absence of specific 
information about which reasons other people were in fact acting upon, subjects anticipated 
others were moved by the worst and most unflattering motive. Even when subjects are told 
 
3 The term “conflict” and synonyms pick out cases where people adopt apparently 
incompatible answers to a question. Take the question “Is capital punishment ever morally 
justified?” as an example. A conflict could involve one person believing it is, another person 
believing it is not, a third suspending judgment (i.e., adopting a settled stance of neither 
believing nor disbelieving; see Friedman 2013), and a fourth being uncertain what to think 
about the issue (see the discussion of “doxastic openness” in Ballantyne 2019, 111–115). 
Importantly, not all conflicts are genuine: sometimes conflicts are merely verbal, where a 
difference in expression or unrecognized miscommunication hides people’s deep agreement 
concerning a question’s answer (Chalmers 2011; Ballantyne 2016).  
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that others have both good and bad motives, they tend to judge the bad ones are the main 
motive. Walmsley and O’Madagain call this the “worst-motive fallacy.” 
 
People also tend to view their opponents’ disagreeable behavior and actions as arising from 
intentions and free choices. For example, Joshua Knobe and collaborators have documented 
the “side-effect effect” (Leslie, Knobe, and Cohen 2006; Feltz 2007): when subjects learn 
about an action that has unintended negative consequences, they often see it as more 
intentional than an identical action that has unintended positive consequences. Some moral 
psychologists have found that when subjects blame others for an action, they often ascribe to 
their targets greater control and freedom (Alicke 2000; Clark et al. 2014). In conflicts, people 
make sense of opponents’ actions by issuing negative moral attributions to their opponents’ 
characters.  
 
Malice attributions can also be fueled by egocentric biases.4 For instance, “naïve realism” is 
the tendency for people to believe their own perceptions are veridical and capture the world 
as it is (Ross and Ward 1996). In conflicts, people assume “I’m right, you’re biased” (Cheek 
and Pronin forthcoming). A plausible implication is that if someone believes that his views 
follow from the correct moral principles or his actions flow from personal virtue, he will 
naturally infer that his opponents—who think and act differently—are moved by false 
principles and character flaws. 
 
Biases toward unflattering attributions can be amplified by group membership and identity. 
Adam Waytz, Liane Young, and Jeremy Ginges (2014) found a “motive attribution 
asymmetry” between ingroup and outgroup members. They examined how people see the 
motivations of their own group compared to other groups. People tend to believe their own 
group is motivated more by love for their own group than by hate and also that other groups 
are motivated more by anger and hate than by love. As Waytz and collaborators note, “failing 
to recognize love as a shared motive between one’s ingroup and outgroup likely exacerbates 
conflict” (2014, 15690). Other research has suggested that shared moral views can “become 
the defining aspect of social identity,” meaning that morality can fuel group conflict (Böhm, 
Thielmann, and Hilbig 2018, 15–16). When ingroup members believe an outgroup has 
incorrect moral commitments or motives, outgroup members get dismissed, denigrated, and 
dehumanized. 
 
It seems then there is good reason to suspect that people in disputes tend to be hyperactive 
malice-attributors. We note that recent experimental evidence is echoed by reports from 
observers of human nature in other eras. The seventeenth-century philosopher La 
Rochefoucauld wrote, for instance: “Our readiness to believe evil, without investigating it 
adequately, results from pride and laziness. We want to find the guilty party, and we do not 
want to go to the trouble of investigating the crime” (1678/2007, 77, V.267) People are 
judgmental, suspicious, cynical, and don’t give opponents the benefit of the doubt. Let us 
grant premise (1) for now. 
 
 
4 Thanks to Jared Celniker and Victor Kumar for discussion. 
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How about premise (2)? If people’s attributions in situations of conflict tend to be overly 
moralistic, leading them to attribute opponents’ beliefs and behavior to malice when they are 
in fact a product of stupidity, then—consistent with premise (2)—the Razor’s disapproval of 
moralistic attributions and approval of epistemic ones should in theory make judgments more 
accurate. But can following the Razor really reduce commonplace biases on attributions?5 
 
We think it’s possible the Razor’s advice could push someone in the opposite direction of 
commonplace biases on moral attribution. A crucial empirical issue needs sorting out, though: 
Is that what the Razor does to someone’s thinking? Yes, sometimes, we expect. Following 
the principle appears to be one way to rein in biased attributions, either making them less 
frequent or less extreme. But what is hard to know is the scope of cases where the Razor helps. 
 
To begin to see why the issue of scope is so important, notice that the Razor can be interpreted 
as a hypothesis about the actual causes of people’s thinking and behavior in conflicts. That 
empirical generalization must hold for the Razor to make someone’s attributions more 
accurate across a range of conflicts. But why think stupidity is more commonplace than 
malice in disputes? Consider a point that chips away at the broad generalization. When two 
people recognize they disagree with each other, they tend to see the other side as mistaken 
(Cheek and Pronin forthcoming); but it is frequently implausible that both sides tend to err 
from stupidity more than malice. In fact, one side may not be mistaken at all. Thus, we have 
reason to doubt the generalization at issue is a correct description of why people in conflicts 
tend to think and behave as they do. 
 
 
5 We must set other questions about premise (2) to the side, but two issues deserve a brief note 
here. 
First, we are exploring the possibility that the Razor debiases people’s attributions of 
malice. But even if your malice attributions are correct, you could still be biased in the 
following sense: correct malice attributions can be part of a poor explanation of someone’s 
error. For example, your opponent could be a moral reprobate, just as you believe he is, but 
his repellant character is not what accounts for his mistake and, as a result, your correct malice 
attribution does not illuminate why he went wrong. We sidestep that issue for now. 
 Second, supposing the Razor can debias, by what mechanism might it work? From the 
armchair, the answer is unclear. Simply alerting people to the threat of a bias is typically not 
sufficient for them to avoid or correct for it (Wilson and Brekke 1994; Wilson, Centerbar, and 
Brekke 2002). The Razor must provide more than a mere warning of potential bias. To debias 
effectively, the principle would need to reconfigure how people form their judgments, perhaps 
by shifting their thinking from “fast, automatic” processes to “slow, deliberate” ones 
(Kahneman 2003). Consider how that might happen. Maybe the Razor helps you recognize 
when your malice attributions lack strong evidence. That is, thinking about the principle 
shows you when you haven’t eliminated the possibility your opponent is stupid as opposed 
to bad. Alternatively, maybe thinking about the principle makes your evaluations more 
sensitive to the available information about your opponent. When following the principle, 
you pay more attention to your opponent’s potential epistemic defects than you would 




The empirical generalization looks even more dubious when we reflect on two further kinds 
of cases. First, people sometimes err more from badness than stupidity. In Quentin 
Tarantino’s 2003 film Kill Bill, one female character remarks, “It’s mercy, compassion, and 
forgiveness I lack—not rationality.” A real-world example could involve Pol Pot, the 
tyrannical leader of the Khmer Rouge who perpetrated genocide in Cambodia. In such 
examples, malice is the correct explanation for someone’s errors, meaning that trying to 
explain these by stupidity would be misdirected. Second, people sometimes err because of 
badness and stupidity. Some of U.S. President Richard Nixon’s mistakes in the White House 
can be traced to both his moral corruption and his paranoia (arguably, sometimes an epistemic 
defect), including the botched prosecution of the “Pentagon Papers” whistleblower, Daniel 
Ellsberg. Nixon’s directive to his White House “plumbers” to illegally break into the office of 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in search of dirt on the former defense analyst was plausibly both stupid 
and bad. 
 
An empirical generalization that would explain why the Razor debiases across cases—
namely, that stupidity is more commonplace than malice in conflicts—is false. That’s because 
one side in a conflict is often correct and not necessarily stupid; sometimes errors are due to 
badness more than stupidity; and sometimes errors are due to a mixture of badness and 
stupidity. So, when opponents blast each other with negative moral attributions, we can’t 
assume those attributions tend to be inaccurate in the full range of cases where the Razor is 
supposed to apply. We should not presume that the Razor leads away from error in all cases.6 
 
A slightly different way to put our point: even though the Razor can correct biased attributions 
under some logically possible conditions, that does not guarantee it improves people’s 
judgment in most ordinary conflicts. If the Razor is good advice because it makes us less 
biased, we need to know more about its performance. One possibility is that the Razor is not 
an effective debiasing technique. Merely warning people does not eliminate or correct many 
types of bias and efforts to debias may even backfire (Schwartz et al. 2007). Perhaps the 
Razor’s message can counteract powerful biases on our attributions, but how that works 
remains to be discovered. Even so, we can be sure that the Razor may improve accuracy in 
some cases while reducing accuracy in others. 
 
We should underline an important implication of reduced accuracy in judgment: people using 
the Razor may be prone to exploitation. This is one “dark side” of the principle. Imagine you 
disagree with someone who actively misleads you about their knowledge. They present 
themselves as intellectually inept or uninformed; but suppose their errors are in fact explained 
by bad motives. Taking the Razor’s guidance by trying to rule out their stupidity before 
attributing malice makes you too charitable—and vulnerable to abuse if you continue to 
interact with them. In these situations, the Razor makes you less accurate than you would be 
without it. But accuracy isn’t everything and one possibility is that the Razor is good advice 
because it makes you more charitable, even at the cost of accuracy. We turn to that idea next.  
 
 
6 We suspect that the Razor’s advocates do not recommend deploying the principle only in 
situations where stupidity is known to be more pervasive than malice. The principle is 
supposed to be beneficial even if its users do not know what type of situation they are in.  
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4. Framing conflict charitably 
 
Could the Razor be beneficial not because it makes people more accurate but because it helps 
them frame conflicts more charitably? We will try a first pass on the idea. As we noted, 
conflicts can become moralized. This easily happens when people hold moral convictions—
beliefs they take to be grounded in a distinction between right and wrong, in contrast to beliefs 
concerning non-moral claims (see Skitka et al. 2021 for a review). In general, people tend to 
perceive their moral convictions as universal truths, applicable across time and place (Skitka 
et al. 2021, 352), and conflict over moral convictions predicts greater intolerance toward 
opponents. For example, people prefer greater social and physical distance from those who 
reject their moral convictions (Skitka et al. 2005; Zaal et al. 2017), an observation made across 
cultures (Skitka et al. 2013). Unsurprisingly, viewing conflict through a moral lens can make 
partisans judge each other harshly.  
 
Moralization can also lead people to frame conflicts in unproductive ways. Suppose two 
groups disagree over an economic or policy issue. They could interpret the conflict as follows: 
the two groups hold the same or highly similar goals and simply happen to think differently 
about the best means to reach those goals. But let’s imagine these groups instead view their 
conflict as arising from significant differences in their goals and intentions. Both sides believe 
the other side wants something bad, or at least wants to block a good outcome. Seeing conflict 
as caused by divergent goals fuels negative moral attributions as well as behaviors that are not 
cooperative, civil, or tolerant. The Razor might help here. It tells partisans that their conflict 
is not necessarily due to a clash of goals but could be caused by the other side’s epistemic 
defects. The Razor encourages a kind of “Gestalt shift,” allowing people to see their 
opponents more charitably—even if not more accurately. The shift presumably helps people 
get along better.  
 
The basic reasoning can be expressed as follows:  
 
(1) People who see conflict as due to differences in goals and motives tend to be 
less cooperative, civil, and tolerant than those who do not (all other things being 
equal). 
(2) Following the Razor’s guidance can prevent you from seeing conflict as due to 
differences in goals and motives.  
(3) Therefore, following the Razor’s guidance can make you tend to be more 
cooperative, civil, and tolerant than those who do not (all other things being 
equal). 
 
(1)–(3), though not deductively valid, purports to explain why the Razor is good advice: the 
principle makes us get along better with our opponents. The rule of thumb is good advice 
because it helps produce a good outcome.7  
 
 
7 On the assumption that getting along better is not valuable all by itself, notice that 
cooperativeness, civility, and tolerance can be instrumentally valuable for securing all sorts of 
social and political benefits, including democracy. 
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How can we evaluate the reasoning? For starters, premise (1) appears to be supported by 
research on moralized conflict (Skitka et al. 2021), so we will grant it here. Premise (2) appears 
to be sensible at least on its face. To begin to why, notice the Razor reminds people that 
disagreement can be explained by epistemic defects, not just moral ones—and also that they 
need to rule out the former explanations before affirming the latter. Plausibly, negative 
epistemic attributions tend to be more charitable than negative moral attributions. From the 
attributor’s perspective, calling someone stupid typically seems less harsh than calling them 
morally bad. Insofar as the Razor can shift people’s construal of conflict in that way, it can 
reduce the conflict’s severity and let them treat their opponents better. Or so goes one line of 
support for premise (2). 
 
An important question is whether merely thinking about the Razor is sufficient to reframe 
conflict charitably. Why couldn’t someone reflect on the Razor’s advice but subsequently see 
their conflict no differently, or even see it more fractiously and tendentiously? That may 
happen occasionally, though we expect otherwise in some important cases.  
 
What follows is a speculative idea in favor of that expectation. The Razor is intuitively 
resonant—nobody needs to argue for its prima facie plausibility. Why is that? Just consider the 
experience of reflecting on the principle in the heat of conflict. The Razor invites you to swap 
out malice attributions for stupidity attributions. What we called the “Gestalt shift” allows 
you to see others’ mistakes as dumb, not evil. Switching one type of attribution for another 
may in part underwrite the Razor’s intuitive appeal, we speculate. When people exchange 
malice for stupidity attributions, they may feel good about themselves—literally. Imagine you 
are in a dispute and you think to yourself, “My opponents are evil!” Then you reflect on the 
Razor and come to think, “No, my opponents are just dumb!” That shift casts you in a positive 
light, not your opponent.  
 
That difference is crucial. One way that your stupidity attributions could improve a conflict 
is by making you feel more positively about your opponents. Alternatively, your stupidity 
attributions could improve a conflict by making you view yourself more positively. We suspect 
the latter is what might happen. When using the Razor, you may feel flattered—seeing 
yourself as smarter than your opponents, instead of judgmentally scolding their inferior moral 
character. Pat yourself on the back for being so charitable; climb atop on your high horse for 
exhibiting civility and maturity. And insofar as the Razor can convey to users the idea that 
they are in some way better—more intelligent, reasonable, charitable, or virtuous—for seeing 
their opponents’ errors flowing from stupidity than from malice, there is some reason to 
expect the Razor can downgrade the severity of conflict. Potentially, the principle helps 
people to act nicer toward others by making them feel nicer about themselves.8 
 
But even if this represents one viable path for the Razor to improve relationships between 
opponents, we think premise (2) requires considerably more support. For a wide range of 
situations, we don’t know whether the Razor works as suggested. Premise (2) implies 
empirical predictions that are far from certain. Although none of this can be settled from the 
 
8 Alternatively, the Razor could sometimes make people puffed up about themselves and thus 
less likely to act charitably toward their perceived-to-be-stupid opponents.  
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armchair, we offer five observations that reveal why it’s hard to predict how the Razor 
influences thinking.  
 
First, when intelligence or epistemic competence is valued by attributors more highly than 
good motives or moral character, attributions of stupidity could amplify conflict more than 
attributions of malice. Often, malice is a greater insult than stupidity, but there are exceptions. 
Imagine a successful scientist who suffers from imposter syndrome (Langford and Clance 
1993). Conceivably, this scientist could assume it’s worse to be called stupid than morally 
bad, given she prizes intelligence above character. How the Razor works in such cases is 
uncertain. 
 
Second, even though the Razor can in principle moderate overly harsh attributions, people 
could find it hard to follow the Razor because malice attributions are so compelling 
phenomenologically. Withholding our negative moral attributions may feel wrong—Those evil 
bastards deserve harsh judgment! Indeed, one key insight from recent moral and political 
psychology is that partisans do not play nice (Skitka et al. 2021). The dynamics of negative 
moral attribution can be illustrated using metaphors of war and violence. Partisans brandish 
a Karmic Bazooka and try to blast their enemies into submission—Take this, you deplorable 
monsters! They viscerally feel that their judgments are righteous, just, and true. Prompting 
people to reflect seriously upon their opponents’ epistemic limitations may be tricky when 
they feel their opponents are immoral. And when they feel personal grievance, they may be 
unable to overlook perceived injustice (Ditto and Rodriguez 2021). In general, morality can 
bias and override the kind of epistemic evaluation the Razor encourages. So, we think there 
are important questions whether, and to what extent, the principle can intervene in conflicts 
fueled by moral convictions and visceral emotions. Potentially, it won’t help precisely where 
it is needed most.9  
 
Third, when people posit an epistemic defect to explain an opponent’s error, they may be 
unable to make sense of the existence of that defect in non-moral terms. They will think 
someone’s stupidity is morally culpable or otherwise a sign of a moral flaw. In other words, 
people can believe their opponent errs because of stupidity and yet come to believe he’s stupid 
because he’s bad. The Razor requires people to presuppose some epistemic defect is not a 
moral defect, but we’re suggesting there can be inadvertent “spillover” from epistemic defect 
to moral defect. For example, during the Covid-19 pandemic many so-called anti-maskers 
claimed that medical-grade face masks do not protect against transmission of the coronavirus. 
Explaining an anti-masker’s error using epistemic defects is easy, but an observer might feel 
the error is so grievous and so easily fixable that the anti-masker must be morally culpable. In 
such cases, the Razor could reinforce malice attributions by making them seem to follow from 
facts about stupidity. 
 
Fourth, the Razor may make people unsure how to interpret their opponents. Their framing 
of a conflict may fall somewhere in between charitable and harsh. What happens then? One 
 
9 A related point concerns the personality traits needed to deploy the Razor. If following the 
principle calls for some degree of intellectual humility (Ballantyne forthcoming-a), many 
people who would benefit from it won’t deploy it. (Thanks to Daniel Relihan for discussion.) 
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possibility is suggested in studies by Steven Fein and James Hilton, who examined subjects’ 
suspicion about an actor’s motivations (Fein and Hilton 1994; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990). 
For Fein and Hilton, suspicion is “a state in which perceivers actively entertain multiple, 
plausibly rival, hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a person’s behavior” (1994, 
168). They found that suspicion makes people less inclined to accept others’ word at face 
value and to see them as less likeable (1994). Insofar as the Razor induces suspicion, it could 
harden or even intensify conflict.10 That sort of possibility challenges the idea that the Razor 
typically makes people get along better with opponents.11 
 
A final point will be familiar by now. The Razor can have a “dark side,” because being too 
charitable is dangerous. Failing to recognize that other people have bad motives can turn 
someone into an easy target for abuse. To take an example from politics, bipartisanship helps 
a group reach important compromises, but these efforts often require one side to downplay 
the possibility that their opponents have bad motives or even autocratic ambitions. 
Misjudging malicious opponents is perilous—the word “appeasement” is one troubling 
reminder. But the challenges here aren’t only because of our overly charitable judgments 
concerning opponents. Our opponents, seeing we are open to extra-generous interpretations 
of them, may try to manipulate us. They may judge that we are stupid. Recall that the Razor’s 
relevance in any situation hinges on the subjective plausibility of stupidity and malice 
attributions. If stupidity is a non-starter as an explanation for our opponents’ errors, they 
could self-present in ways that raise the plausibility of their stupidity, thus trying to lower the 
plausibility of their malice. Our opponents could hoodwink us by managing our impressions. 
The deceptive self-presentation points toward a cynical maxim: Never admit to malice when 
stupidity will suffice. People often want others to give them the benefit of the doubt about malice 
and so they may sacrifice their perceived epistemic competence to save their moral 
reputation—“I just didn’t know...” In short, if we use the Razor, bad actors may take advantage 
of our good will and exploit us. 
 
In our discussion of the possibility that the Razor makes people more charitable, we assumed 
it can be good advice even if it doesn’t tend to improve the accuracy of moral attributions. 
But notice how it could secure different epistemic benefits when it moderates people’s harsh 
judgments about their opponents. Suppose you initially frame a dispute as caused by your 
opponent’s malice. Then the Razor prompts you to see your opponent’s mistake as due to 
stupidity. That new interpretation makes you more open to productive dialogue and 
 
10 Fein and Hilton note: “Suspicious perceivers may not be able or care to hide their suspicions 
from the target of their suspicions. They may act in a more cold and distant way, perhaps 
guarding themselves from any self-disclosures that the target potentially could use to his or 
her advantage. This set of behaviors is likely to create a vicious circle in which the perceivers’ 
suspicions lead the target to behave in strange ways, thus reinforcing the perceivers’ 
suspicions” (1994, 193). 
11 Our worry is that premises (1) and (2) could easily fail to count as good evidence for (3). 
That is, even if seeing conflict in terms of divergent motives makes people get along less [i.e., 
(1)] and following the Razor tends to prevent someone from seeing conflict in such terms [i.e., 
(2)], the Razor could still increase someone’s harshness toward her opponents because it 
makes her suspicious. 
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cooperation. Rather than dismissing your opponent as a moral miscreant, you try to share 
persuasive evidence.12 You show greater willingness to listen to your opponent’s reasoning, 
at least while adjusting your angle of dialectical attack. Your greater openness to engagement 
and listening could bring epistemic benefits—not just for your opponent but for you as well.13 
 
So far, our exploration of the Razor has focused on matters of interpersonal judgment. But 
we think the Razor obscures an important matter: the person using the Razor. 
 
5. Look in the mirror 
 
The Razor is supposed to aid our judgment by prompting us to think about other people. It 
fixes our attention on our judgment of them, not ourselves or our judgment of ourselves. Even 
if the Razor sometimes turns out to be good advice in the sense that it yields benefits, it can 
easily fail to deliver when we lack knowledge to properly deploy it. We will note two 
limitations of self-insight—specifically, insights into one’s own knowledge—that impede the 
principle’s operation. The first is a type of “blind spot” that prevents us from recognizing the 
ways in which others’ belief-forming processes lead to mistakes; the second is a failure to 
scrutinize weaknesses in our own thinking and then using the Razor to bolster our erroneous 
confidence.  
 
As we begin to set out the “blind spot” idea, consider a basic observation: people sometimes 
project their knowledge onto others. They assume others know what they themselves know 
and feel what they feel (Ditto and Koleva 2011; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber 1989). 
For instance, suppose you believe some claim is obviously true and compelling to everyone 
in your community. When your neighbor rejects the claim, you may reactively explain his 
deviation by attributing malice. He should know better—he denies something you believe is 
obvious to him. Of course, if your projection is mistaken, your attribution of malice may be 
too hasty. 
 
Move from the example to some more general ideas. People in conflicts make assumptions 
concerning their opponents’ belief-forming methods or processes. Opponents’ methods are 
not directly observable but must be inferred from behavior or based on pieces of background 
knowledge. As we already noted, people may project their own situation onto others by 
assuming self-similarity: their opponents get beliefs by using the same kind of processes they 
themselves use. But assumptions of similarity can fail because others’ thinking may go in 
directions people do not and perhaps cannot anticipate. Take some examples. You assume 
someone’s political opinions are based on reports from one pundit; in fact, his opinions are 
based on reports from another pundit. You take for granted that a person formed a belief 
 
12 We speculate that people tend to think moral change is often harder, and less likely 
achieved, than “epistemic change.” That is, becoming a more well-informed or accurate 
thinker tends to be seen as easier than becoming a morally better person. 
13 Of course, someone’s being overly charitable could allow her opponents lead her away from 
the truth when she is correct. Supposing she is more likely to engage with opponents she 
regards as stupid than evil, her opponents get opportunities to mislead her. (Thanks to Peter 
Seipel for discussion.) 
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through testimony; instead, her belief is based on perceptual experience. Or perhaps you 
presume a claim is intuitively obvious to someone; but what’s obvious to him is the negation 
of that claim. In such situations, you find yourself in a method blind spot: you neither recognize 
how others formed their beliefs nor the particular epistemic defects could give rise to their 
mistakes. You are oblivious to why they think as they do. A method blind spot could be 
sizable when you disagree with people whose ideological commitments or cultural 
backgrounds are quite different than yours. In general, biases on perspective-taking—such as 
the “curse of knowledge” (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber 1989), the inability to think 
about a topic from a less informed perspective—suggest that someone’s high confidence in 
her own views may lead to confusions about what and how their opponents know. 
 
What exactly are the implications of the method blind spot for using the Razor? The issues 
here are complex, but we’ll note one important type of situation. Prompted by the Razor, you 
may wonder ad nauseam whether your opponent might have erred due to stupidity; but if his 
epistemic defects are hidden inside your blind spot, you won’t see them. You may too readily 
conclude he’s morally bad, not stupid, even in cases where his error is due to stupidity. 
Deploying the Razor inside a blind spot makes matters worse. 
 
To be sure, all of us frequently find ourselves in method blind spots. The best advice to break 
out is straightforward. Talk to your opponents. Try to find out what they know and don’t 
know, and how they arrived at their opinions. Seek to better understand their motives. Trying 
to suss out someone’s belief-forming methods is not always easy or possible, but engagement 
is often worth the effort.14 In support of this advice, some research suggests that sharing facts 
doesn’t bridge political divides as effectively as sharing personal experience does. In one 
study, subjects had greater respect for their opponents’ moral beliefs when their opponents 
appealed to personal experiences, not facts (Kubin et al. 2021). What may be going on is this: 
when someone shares her experiences, that helps to illuminate the method she uses to form 
opinions, allowing her ideological opponents to interpret her opinions more charitably. 
Crucially, efforts to eliminate or reduce a method blind spot require our awareness that there 
is, or could be, one. We can’t use the Razor well if we are unknowingly trapped in the blind 
spot and can’t distinguish someone’s stupidity from malice. 
 
Turn to a second failure of self-insight: the Razor can fuel confidence in mistaken views. As 
we noted, the principle takes your own correctness as a presumed “fixed point” for reasoning 
and tries to pivot your thinking about your opponent. But what happens if your opponent is 
right and you are wrong? Or if both of you are wrong? And what if you are the one who needs 
to recognize your own stupidity or malice? Even granting you have reliable access to facts 
concerning the goodness or badness of your intentions and moral character, some epistemic 
defects can be tricky to identify: you may lack evidence or conceptual grasp to recognize your 
ignorance and spot your flaws (Dunning 2011; Ballantyne forthcoming-c). But if you are 




14 Ballantyne (forthcoming-b) discusses challenges of engaging with opponents when our 
knowledge about them is limited and conflict is highly polarized. 
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To see why, notice that appealing to an intuitively resonant principle may encourage you to 
believe you are being reasonable while working through a conflict. The act of consulting the 
principle seems like what a good thinker would do. But aided by the Razor your reflection 
could easily focus too much on your opponent and too little on yourself. That would not be 
surprising given the ubiquitous confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998). People are more adept at 
finding flaws in arguments that threaten their views than flaws in supporting arguments, all 
things being equal (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Ditto 2009). A similar effect produces 
asymmetrical levels of scrutiny toward your opponents’ intellectual and moral character 
compared to your own character. You pick apart your opponents to uncover their stupidity 
or malice while giving yourself a free pass. Sometimes, when you are mistaken, the Razor 
may pull your focus away from where it should be while simultaneously making you feel 
you’ve done your level best. 
 
To dodge that problem, we could supplement the Razor with another rule: Never attribute 
someone’s error to either a moral or epistemic defect before you have seriously investigated your own 
moral and epistemic competence. The idea is reminiscent of age-old wisdom: “First take the log 
out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your brother’s eye.” 
Even if the supplementary rule can prevent the Razor from inflating confidence in wrong 
views, it restricts the Razor’s scope. Moreover, for many controversial issues, knowing you 
are intellectually competent turns out to be challenging (Ballantyne 2019).  
 
All of this raises questions concerning the Razor’s proper use. No principle can resolve every 
problem, and so wielding the Razor without coordinating with other principles can lead to 
trouble. People have a toolbox of principles and rules for judgment and, ideally, they use the 
right ones at the right time. Our point is that anyone trying to deploy the Razor should be 
wary of two mistakes: using the principle inside a method blind spot or having it boost 
confidence in erroneous views. What is needed is greater self-awareness. When using any 




Is Hanlon’s Razor good or bad advice? In this essay, we criticized two proposals in favor of 
the Razor. One sees the benefits of the principle in terms of making us more accurate. The 
other sees benefits in terms of making us more charitable. Our discussion has been 
preliminary, but we hope careful empirical investigation can illuminate when and why the 
Razor is beneficial, if it is. For the time being, what else can we say about the Razor?  
 
The Razor attempts to address the problem of detecting facts that explain opponents’ 
mistakes. Why do our opponents screw up? For hypermoralists, detecting stupidity in the 
noise of malice can be difficult: we are too eager to attribute bad motives and unsavory 
character to people who disagree with us. When we try to explain their mistakes, we are 
subject to two distinct errors:  
 
Misidentifying-stupidity error: attributing an error to malice that is due to stupidity 
 




The idea driving the Razor is simple enough. People make misidentifying-stupidity errors too 
frequently and they should minimize those errors by risking misidentifying-malice errors. The 
Razor attempts to adjust our criterion for detecting the source of opponents’ mistakes. People 
should see stupidity more often in their opponents, even if that means they sometimes see 
stupidity where there is in fact malice.  
 
Regrettably, the Razor is not sensitive to what matters most. As we pointed out earlier, one 
danger of misidentifying-malice errors is exploitation by bad actors. Ruminating on the 
possibility of abuse, or getting burned by a bad actor, may lead people to adjust their criterion 
in the opposite direction of the Razor’s advice, seeing others as being bad more than stupid. 
Some people may feel that being highly sensitive to malice is a safe policy. They will not be 
exploited by opponents if they assume each and every opponent is bad. Of course, the costs 
of such a strategy are enormous—entrenched conflict, negativity, and polarization. Even if 
people who see malice everywhere become “safe” in some sense, they will find themselves 
trapped in a world of profound negativity. And given the costs of such an outlook, people 
may feel the Razor was a good idea after all: viewing our opponents as stupid more than bad 
makes our interactions more positive and allows compromise and cooperation.  
 
We are not required to choose, once and for all, between a “safe” but negative criterion and 
a more open, cooperative one. People adjust their criterion for detecting stupidity or malice 
on the fly. Worried about the costs of exploitation, we crank up our sensitivity to moral 
defects; and worried about the costs of failing to cooperate and compromise, we boost our 
sensitivity to epistemic defects. In fine-tuning our criterion, circumstances matter. Let us 
illustrate the point using a pair of examples. 
 
In 2015, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden delivered an address to the graduating class at Yale 
University. Biden recounted a story from his time as a Senator back in the 1970s. One 
Republican Senator, Jesse Helms, had argued vigorously against legislation that was the 
precursor of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Biden was disgusted. He recalled meeting 
with a Democratic colleague, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, and complaining that Helms 
had “no social redeeming value” and didn’t care about disabled people. In response, 
Mansfield shared a story, which Biden recounted to his audience at Yale: 
 
[T]hree years earlier, Jesse and Dot Helms, sitting in their living room in early 
December before Christmas, reading an ad in the Raleigh Observer, the picture 
of a young man, 14-years-old with braces on his legs up to both hips, saying, 
all I want is someone to love me and adopt me. [Mansfield] looked at me and 
he said: and they adopted him, Joe. 
I felt like a fool. [Mansfield] then went on to say: Joe, it’s always 
appropriate to question another man’s judgment, but never appropriate to 
question his motives because you simply don’t know his motives. (Biden 2015) 
 
As Biden tells the story, Mansfield’s advice became an insight for Biden’s work in 
government over the decades. Biden adjusted his criterion for viewing his colleagues’ errors: 
“[W]hen you question a man’s motive... it’s awful [sic] hard to reach consensus. It’s awful 
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[sic] hard having to reach across the table and shake hands. No matter how bitterly you 
disagree, though, it is always possible if you question judgment and not motive... Resist the 
temptation to ascribe motive” (Biden 2015). 
 
Some may suspect Biden’s good will toward others makes him an easy target for abuse by 
malicious actors.15 With that in mind, consider a contrasting example from a classic essay, 
“How to Swim with Sharks: A Primer” (Cousteau 1973). The essay offers some darkly 
humorous advice for dealing with dangerous people (“sharks”):  
 
Assume all unidentified fish are sharks. Not all sharks look like sharks, and 
some fish that are not sharks sometimes act like sharks. Unless you have 
witnessed docile behavior in the presence of shed blood on more than one 
occasion, it is best to assume an unknown species is a shark. Inexperienced 
swimmers have been badly mangled by assuming that docile behavior in the 
absence of blood indicates that the fish is not a shark. (Cousteau 1973, 525–26) 
 
Let’s suppose each of us must lock in our criteria for detecting malice and the options are to 
be like Biden or the swimmer. Which option would you choose? Of course, these are extreme 
positions—never assuming malice or always assuming it—and both have genuine 
downsides. We should instead hope to find criteria that hit a “sweet spot” between the 
extremes.  
 
What this little thought experiment exposes is a fundamental limitation for any automatic 
adjustment of our criteria, whether the adjustment tips the scales toward stupidity or malice. 
An automatic adjustment won’t give people a chance to reap the benefits of cooperation 
and avoid the costs of abuse. The goal should be to become more sensitive to the difference 
between malice and stupidity. We need to discriminate between errors caused by moral 
defects and epistemic defects.  
 
Does that mean the Razor is bad advice? Not necessarily. We think the Razor encourages 
users to find the “sweet spot.” When an error is adequately explained by stupidity, says the 
Razor explicitly, attribute stupidity. The Razor adds in an implicit exhortation, too: whether 
or not stupidity provides an adequate explanation in any situation deserves careful scrutiny 
and then and only then should explanations based on malice come into play. Wise judgment 
is vital. But we are on our own: the Razor express a lofty aspiration without explaining how 
to attain it. 
 
In a world of conflict and partisanship, it’s tempting to believe that stepping back from 
sectarian battles between “good and evil” and considering more mundane explanations for 
 
15 Importantly, some people won’t accept at face value Biden’s proposal to leave motives 
unquestioned. Think about how his proposal would be viewed inside the U.S. Senate. 
Imagine Biden’s fellow senators wondering privately: “Is Joe hiding relevant motives? What 
doesn’t he want us to know when we hear his arguments for legislation? He insists he won’t 
question our motives and wants us to do likewise, but could that be a ploy to soften us up?” 
(No critic will be moved by a stock Bidenesque rejoinder: “C’mon, Jack!”) 
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our opponents’ behavior could infuse greater humility and civility into discourse and debate. 
There may be some truth to that. But we have tried to show how judgment in the real world 
gets complicated: our knowledge of others’ thinking and motives is limited, the dynamics of 
social judgment are complex, and people sometimes act in bad faith. The challenge of 
becoming more discriminating about other people requires more than a clever, resonant 
principle like the Razor. And it doesn’t help to wield that principle incautiously, without 
subtle judgment or sensitivity to context. Hanlon’s Razor is not a machete for judging others. 
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